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OrTro SANDROCK*
ELKE VAN ARNHEIM**

New Merger Control Rules in the EECt
Article 8a of the Treaty of Rome' (EEC Treaty), inserted by the Single
European Act 2 in 1986, provides for the establishment of an internal market by
the end of 1992. This internal market is intended to create a homogeneous
economy within the European Community (EC) where national regulations cease
to impede the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital. For a long
time, undertakings 3 established in and outside the EC have tried, and still try, to
protect or strengthen their economic position in the coming internal market. Such
actions occur principally by means of large-scale concentrations, 4 and Europe
has experienced a wave of mergers during the last five years. This activity
highlighted the need for effective merger control rules in the European Economic
Community (EEC) and led to the adoption of Council Regulation 4064/89 on
December 21, 1989. 5
I. European Merger Control in the EEC Treaty
The original 1957 version of the EEC Treaty adopted no specific rule aimed at
control of concentrations. Although six years prior to the EEC Treaty Article 66
of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (ECSC) introduced a special
*Professor and Director of the Institute of International Business Law at the Law School of the
University of Monster, Germany. LL.B., 1953, University of G6ttingen, Germany; LL.M., 1956,
Yale University; LL.D., 1956, University of G6ttingen, Germany; 1958 admission to the bar in
Germany.
**LL.B., 1984, University of Miinster, Germany; 1988 admission to the bar in Germany; LL.D.,
1990, University of Monster; presently studying at the London School of Economics and Political
Science for an LL.M. degree.
tThis article is a companion piece to the one on "The Notification of Mergers Under the New EEC
Merger Control Regulation" by Patrick Thieffry, Philip Van Doom, and Peter Nahmias, which
appeared in the Fall 1991 issue of THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER.
1. 25 Mar. 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
2. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 7 (1987) (effective on July 1, 1987).
3. The term "undertaking" means "company."
4. This term will be used in the text for mergers and acquisitions.
5. 32 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 395) 1 (1989); Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2839 (1989). The
corrected version is in 33 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 257) 13 (1990).
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merger control procedure, the authors of the EEC Treaty did not see such a
need for the EEC. Concentrations were considered a means for strengthening
the national economies and integrating them into the Common Market. Nevertheless, during the long period between the establishment of the EEC in 1957
and the entry into effect of Regulation 4064/89 in 1990, the Commission and
the European Court of Justice attempted to use the general rules of competition
embodied in the EEC Treaty to control mergers at the EC level. 6 Two articles
of the EEC Treaty were particularly important: article 86 and article 85.
A.

MERGER CONTROL UNDER ARTICLE

86

OF THE

EEC

TREATY

Article 86 of the Treaty prohibits any abuse of a dominant position within the
Common Market, or a substantial part of it insofar as it may affect trade between
Member States. Article 86 provides a list of abusive practices, including: imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or unfair trading conditions; limiting
production, markets, or technical development; applying discriminatory conditions; and making tie-in arrangements. Based on this general language, article 86
has been applied to mergers that could be qualified as abuses of dominant market
positions. 7 The leading case was the Continental Can8 decision rendered by the
Commission in 1971. In that decision, the Commission stated that mergers may
fall within the scope of article 86 and, hence, have to be dissolved if and insofar
as the mergers are carried out by undertakings that already hold a dominant
market position, and if those enterprises gain by their merger still more market
power so as to eliminate any further actual or potential competition in the
Community or in a substantial part of it. 9 The European Court of Justice endorsed this interpretation of article 86.10
Article 86 can block concentrations, however, only when at least one undertaking had achieved market dominance prior to merging. Correspondingly, article 86 could not and cannot be applied to concentrations where market dominance follows concentration, that is, where market dominance is achieved as a
consequence of the merger. In view of this shortcoming, article 86 could not and
still cannot be regarded as an adequate instrument for effective EEC merger
control.
6. See Korah, The Control of Mergers Under the EEC Competition Law, 1987 EUR. COMPET.
L. REV. 239.
7. See Memorandum on the Problem of Industrial Concentration in the Common Market,
Competition Series No. 3, (1965) reprinted in F. FINE, MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES IN EUROPE
annex G (1989); Sandrock, Overview of Antitrust Law and Policy, in EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNrTY: TRADE AND INVESTMENT § 15.03 [5] (J. Norton ed. 1986).

8. The Continental Can Co. Inc., Commission Decision of 9 Dec. 1971, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR.
(No. L 7) 25 (1972); [1972] 11 Common Mkt. L.R. DII.
9. Id. at para. 26.
10. Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Com'n [1973] E.C.R.
215; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171; 10 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 311 (1973) (with a note by
Alexander).
VOL. 25, NO. 4

EEC MERGER CONTROL RULES

B.

MERGER CONTROL UNDER ARTICLE

85

OF THE

EEC
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TREATY

Article 85 of the Treaty prohibits all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted practices that restrict
competition and thereby affect trade between Member States unless the Commission exempts the transaction. This article applies only to the conduct of
independent undertakings when their independence remains unaffected by the
restrictive practice agreed upon between them. As a result of a typical merger, at
least one undertaking loses its independence. Hence, the Commission was unable to apply article 85 to concentrations except when the undertakings concerned remained independent, as in the organization of a joint venture.
The European Court of Justice confirmed this principle in its Philip Morris
decision." In 1984, the South African Rembrandt Group Ltd. and the American
Philip Morris Company agreed that Philip Morris would acquire a 30.8 percent
stake in Rothmans, a subsidiary wholly owned by Rembrandt. Philip Morris,
however, would hold only 24.9 percent of the voting rights in Rothmans. The
parties had previously failed to overcome objections raised by the Commission
and by several national authorities to plans of Philip Morris to acquire a larger
share. Thus Philip Morris owned 30.8 percent of Rothmans' equity, but could
exercise voting rights only to an extent of 24.9 percent.
The Commission found no objection to the parties' agreement since Morris did
not acquire a substantial influence on Rothmans and Rothmans thus remained
under the exclusive control of Rembrandt. On appeal by competitors of Morris
and Rembrandt, however, the European Court declared article 85 to be, in
principle, applicable. The Court reasoned that though the undertakings concerned remained independent after the agreement had entered into effect, "such
an acquisition may nevertheless serve as an instrument for influencing the commercial conduct of the companies in question [Rembrandt and Philip Morris] so
as to restrict or distort competition on the market on which they carry on business."' 12 In the final result the Court dismissed the appeal, finding that competition between Rembrandt and Philip Morris remained unaffected, and that Morris's restricted voting rights in Rothmans did not enable it to influence the
commercial conduct of Rothmans.
The decision of the European Court illustrates that the acquisition of a minority shareholding may violate article 85 of the Treaty: Article 85 may apply to
concentrations where the undertakings involved remain independent. Nevertheless, the Court's judgment makes it clear that an acquisition of a majority
shareholding is not impeded by article 8513 when the acquisition cannot be used
11. Joined Cases 142 and 156/84 British American Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds v. Com'n (Philip
Morris) (1987] E.C.R. 4487; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405.
12. Id. at para. 37.
13. Cf. LeBolzer, The New EEC Merger Control Policy After the Adoption of Regulation
4064189, 14 WORLD COMPETITION 31, 35 (1990); Blumberg & Schodermeier, No Smoke without Fire
INT'L FIN. L. REV. 35 (Jan. 1988).
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to influence commercial conduct so as to restrict competition. Therefore, the
Philip Morris decision cannot be interpreted as the introduction of a general
European merger control. To the contrary, article 85 could, and it still can, only
be applied to a very limited number of concentrations.
II. European Merger Control through Regulation 4064/89
To cope with the insufficiency of the EEC Treaty, it was necessary to create a
new legal instrument granting additional powers to the Community to enable it
to challenge mergers that were incompatible with the objective of "nondistorted
competition" enshrined in article 3(f) of the EEC Treaty). 14 To this end, the
EEC Council adopted Council Regulation 4064/89 on Control of Concentrations
between Undertakings in December 1989; Regulation 4064/89 entered into force
on September 21, 1990.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Shortly after the European Court had confirmed, in its Continental Can decision, 15 the applicability of article 86 to concentrations, the Commission in
1973 presented a draft European Merger Control Regulation to the EEC Council. 16 This draft regulation and its subsequent revisions sought to go beyond

articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty by granting to the Community additional powers
over concentrations. These early draft regulations simply prohibited concentrations incompatible with the Common Market without specifying any particular
criteria of market dominance that, for the operation of the control, would have to
be met. Moreover, the introduction of these drafts was based not only on article
87, but also on article 235 of the Treaty, a provision that required a unanimous
decision of all Member States in the Council. Without specific criteria of market
dominance, however, such unanimous support could not be obtained for the 1973
draft or for its subsequent revisions presented in 1982,17 1984,18 and 1986.19
The insufficiency of the Treaty, revealed again by the Philip Morris decision
in 1987, foreshadowed a new beginning for European merger control. In April
1988 the Commission presented a new draft Regulation, 20 and for the first time
the question of the concentration's compatibility with the Common Market was
connected with the criterion of market dominance. However, numerous exemp-

L.

14. See Hawk, The American Antitrust Revolution: A Lesson for the EEC?, 1988 EUR. COMPET.
53.

REV.

15. Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can v. Com'n [1973] E.C.R. 215; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171; 10 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 311 (1973).
16. 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 91) 1 (1973).
17. 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 36) 3 (1982).
18. 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 51) 8 (1984).
19. 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 324) 5 (1986).
20. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 30) 4 (1988); see Sutherland, The New Proposals of the
Commission on ConcentrationControl, EEC COLLOQUIUM 3 (Nov. 3, 1988) (an EC publication).
VOL. 25, NO. 4
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tions based on questionable industrial policy considerations riddled the general
rule put forth by the Commission.
These exemptions were a major point of dispute during the negotiations over
the draft.2 t In particular Germany, backed up to a certain extent by Great Britain,
expressed its fears that such an extensive catalogue of industrial policy considerations could endanger the realization of a competition-oriented regime of
merger control.22 Ultimately, as a result of the political pressure exerted by
Germany and Great Britain, these exemptions were abandoned. Notwithstanding
this accord on the suppression of industrial policy considerations, remarkable
differences of opinion remained when the EEC Council finally met on December
21, 1989. Due to an increasing sense of urgency, however, the Council reached
a compromise and passed Regulation 4064/89, which entered into effect on
September 21, 1990.23
B.

THE SCOPE OF REGULATION 4064/89

A merger control may be exercised not only on the level of the EC, but also
on the national level. Many Member States of the EC already had long-standing,
but differing, national statutory regulations providing for the control of concentrations. 24 The first problem the EC legislature had to cope with, and one of the
most cumbersome, was the delimitation of the sphere in which the EC merger
control, as opposed to the different national merger controls, would operate.
Concomitant with such delimitation the EC legislature also had to determine the
international purview of Regulation 4064/89: a purview of utmost importance for
all undertakings based outside the EC, but affecting mergers and acquisitions
within or even outside the EC if there are effects within the EC boundaries.
For the purpose of these delimitations, Regulation 4064/89 introduces a magic
notion: the Regulation applies to "all concentrations with a Community dimen21. See Mestmacker, Merger Control in the Common Market: Between Competition Policy and
Industrial Policy, European/American Antitrust and Trade Law, in FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. ch. 20
(1988).
22. See Kartte, Dopingfiir die Giganten, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Apr. 22, 1989, at 15;
Mundorf, Zustimmung der Bundesrepublik wurde Verzicht auf die Ordnungspolitik bedeuten, Handelsblatt, Oct. 27, 1989; H61zler, Die Bundesrepublik wird ihre ordnungspolitischen Essentials in
Brussel nicht durchsetzen k6nnen, Handelsblatt, Nov. 21, 1989, at 4; Ho1zler, Bei den Kontrollkriterien ist
der Mull der Industriepolitik iibernommen worden, Handelsblatt, Nov. 27, 1989, at 5;
Immenga, Der Preis der EG-Fusionskontrolle, Handelsblatt, Dec. 19, 1989.
23. See Bechtold, Die Grundzuige der neuen EWG-Fusionskontrolle, 36 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 253 (1990); Niederleithinger, Grundfragen der neuen europaischen
Zusammenschluokontrolle, EUROPAISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERRECHT 73 (1990).

24. France: La Loi Portant Amlioration de la Concurrence (30 Dec. 1985), art. 4, 1985,
Journal Officiel de laR6publique Francaise [JO.] 15-513. Spain: Defense of Competition Law, ch.
II, art. 14, Ley 16/1989 (B.P.O. 18 Julio 1989). United Kingdom: Fair Trading Act, 1973, ch. 41,
§§ 64, 65, 75, 84. Germany: Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen, 22 Dez. 1990, §§ 22-24(c),
Bundesgesetzblatt, [BGBI] 1 2486. Italy: L. 10 Oct. 1990, n. 287, norme della tutela della concurrenza e del mercato, arts. 5-9, Gazetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana [G.U.] 13 Oct. 1990,
n. 240.
WINTER 1991
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sion" as defined in article 1, paragraph 2. According to paragraph 2, a concentration has a Community dimension where:
(a) the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is
more than ECU 5,000 million, and
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 250 million,
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State.
What is behind this almost incomprehensible language?
1. The Community Dimension as Distinguished
from the Different National Dimensions
In the first place, article 1, paragraph 2(a) makes it clear that the new Regulation is not concerned with "peanut" mergers, but only with those of elephantine size. The combined aggregate worldwide turnover 25 of all undertakings
taking part in the concentration (the Regulation speaks of "undertakings concerned") must exceed ECU 5,000 million, 26 which, at the current 27 rate of
exchange, would amount to about U.S. $6,850 million. This criterion is wholly
unrelated to any Community dimension. Article 1, paragraph 2(b) specifies that
at least two of the undertakings concerned must each reach a Community-wide
turnover of more than ECU 250 million (approximately U.S. $342.5 million).
Thus the minimum aggregate amount of sales within the EC required to trigger
the application of Regulation 4064/89 is two times ECU 250 million (approximately U.S. $685 million). Such an aggregate amount, however, still is of no
relevance for the operation of Regulation 4064/89 where not only two, but each
of the undertakings concerned, achieves more than two-thirds of its individual
sales within the same Member State. In this instance it is assumed the concentration has only a national dimension and does not significantly affect trade
between Member States.
The requirement of Community dimension was a major point of dispute in the
negotiations between the Member States prior to the adoption of the Regulation.
The Community dimension of a concentration determines the scope of the Regulation and thereby allocates power to the Commission at the expense of each
Member State. The threshold of 5,000 million ECU was a compromise between
a threshold of 10,000 million ECU favored by the German and British delegations 28 (which would have left all concentrations below that level under the rules
of the national legislatures) and a threshold of 1,000 million proposed by the
25. The Regulation uses "turnovers" to mean sales.
26. See Soames, The "Community Dimension" in the EEC Merger Regulation: The Calculation
of the Turnover Criteria, 1990 EUR. COMPET. L. REV. 213, 215.
27. End of February 1991.
28. See Elland, The Mergers Control Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, 1990 EUR. COMPE'r. L.
REV. 111; Soames, supra note 26, at 220.
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Commission. Under the German proposal the Commission would revise only
about ten mergers annually. Such a high threshold would have preserved the prior
powers of the national authorities to a far greater extent. Now it is anticipated that
forty to sixty merger operations per year will meet the Regulation's threshold of
5,000 million ECU.
According to paragraph 10 of Regulation 4064/89's preamble, these thresholds are to be reexamined in light of the experience gained by the end of the
initial phase of the Regulation's implementation. To this effect, article 1,
paragraph 3 provides that the threshold figures shall be reviewed before the end
of 1993. The thresholds are expected to be lowered then to an aggregate
turnover of 2,000 million ECU and to a Community-wide turnover of 100
million ECU. 29
2. Application of Regulation 4064/89 to
Concentrationsof Non-Community Dimension
Even if a concentration does not have a Community dimension within the
meaning of article 1, article 22, paragraphs 3-5 provide that the Commission
may apply the Regulation to concentrations below the mentioned thresholds at
the request of a Member State. Under these conditions, the commission will
examine the concentration concerned with a view to determining whether it
creates or strengthens a dominant position in the territory of that Member State
and whether the trade between the Member States could be affected thereby.
Several states including the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg, which do
not have their own merger control rules, requested such a provision to enable
them to invoke the Commission's facilities of merger control for the protection
of their own national economies. 30 Nevertheless, the Commission has announced it will not intervene in the concentration of undertakings with a combined aggregate worldwide turnover of less than 2,000 million ECU and a
Community turnover level of less than 100 million ECU. 3 1 The life span of this
intervention of Regulation 4064/89 below Community dimension is limited,
however; article 22, paragraphs 3-5 will apply only until the thresholds laid
down in article 1, paragraph 2 have been reviewed. 32
3. The InternationalPurview of Regulation 4064/89
Regulation 4064/89 applies to all concentrations that have an effect in the
common market, notwithstanding the nationality of the undertakings involved.
This is in accord with the well-known "doctrine of effects" endorsed by the

29.
in 1990
30.
31.
32.

Erklarungeniir das Ratsprotokoll vom 19 Dezember 1989 zu art. 1, Erkl. 1, lit. a, reprinted
WIRTSCHAFr UND WETIBEWERB S. 240; Soames, supra note 26, at 220.
See Soames, supra note 26, at 222.
EUROPE, no. 5907, Sept. 25-26, 1989, at 11; Elland, supra note 28, at 117.
Regulation 4064/89, art. 22, para. 6, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 395) 1, 12 (1989).
WINTER 1991
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European Court in its Continental Can decision of 197333 and used by the
Commission since then as a basis for determining the international purview of the
EEC's antitrust provisions. 34 A link to the EEC market is, however, required by
article 1, paragraph 2(b), which provides that the Regulation is only applicable
if each of at least two of the undertakings involved has an aggregate Communitywide turnover of more than 250 million ECU. 3 5 Thus, if the undertakings do not
have their principal fields of activities in the Community, for Regulation 4064/89
to operate, the undertakings concerned must carry on at least some substantial
operations within the boundaries of the EEC. 36
C.

THE DEFINITION OF CONCENTRATION

What is a concentration under Regulation 4064/89? The definition of concentration will, on the one hand, positively identify the kind of merger required to
satisfy the criteria of the Regulation. The definition will, on the other hand,
identify cases where the Regulation is not applicable. In situations where the
Regulation does not apply, the Commission will have to examine whether instead
of Regulation 4064/89, articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty must be applied.
Finally, the Commission will determine whether joint ventures will fall into the
purview of the Regulation, and if so, to what extent.
1. The Criteriafor a Concentration
Article 3, paragraph 1 of Regulation 4064/89 sets out criteria for the Regulation's notion of concentration:
A concentration shall be deemed to arise where:
(a) two or more previously independent undertakings merge, or
(b) one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or
-one or more undertakings acquire, whether by purchase of securities or
assets, by contract or by any other means, direct or indirect control of the
whole or parts of one or more other undertakings.
Thus, a concentration may be effectuated by two different procedures: either by
a "clear-cut" merger, or by the acquisition of direct or indirect control over
another undertaking.
The definition of a "clear-cut" merger does not present many difficulties.
According to Council's Directive 78/855/EEC of October 9, 1978 (Third Directive on Company Law 37 ), companies merge when one of them absorbs the
33. Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v. Com'n, para. 14-16 [1973] E.C.R. 215,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8171, 10 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 311 (1973).
34. Kugellager, 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 343) 19, 25 (1974); Johnson & Johnson, 23 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 377) 16, 24 (1980); Hasselblad, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 161) 18, 29 (1982).
35. See supra text section 11.B. 1.
36. See preamble, para. 12.
37. 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 295) 36 (1978).
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other (the absorbed company transferring its assets to the absorbing company
while losing its juristic personality) or where all merging companies become
extinct after transfer of their assets to a newly organized third company. Mergers
in such a narrow sense of the term will be rather rare. The acquisition of direct
or indirect control over another undertaking will occur more frequently. This
kind of case will probably be the Commission's weekly bread; unfortunately, its
definition poses more problems.
According to the above quoted article 3, paragraph 1, control may be acquired
by one or more persons who already control at least one undertaking. In this
alternative, natural persons already in control of one or more companies are the
actors. A second alternative presupposes the existence of one or more companies
which gain control of one or more other companies; here, the acquiring companies are the Regulation's addressees. While such definition of the actors of a
concentration is rather self-evident, article 3 takes great care to define thresholds
where control by such actors begins. Pursuant to article 3, paragraph 3, control
may be obtained
by rights, contracts or any other means which, either separately or jointly and having
regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of exercising
decisive influence on an undertaking, in particular by:
(a) ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking;
(b) rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or
decisions of the organs of an undertaking. [Emphasis added.]
"Control" in the meaning of the Regulation may be summarized as the legal or
factual possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking. It is not
necessary, however, that such control is exercised; the mere possibility for its
exercise is sufficient. Further, a mere potential for influence is sufficient for the
existence of control. For example, even a minority share can be regarded as a
concentration where the distribution and the size of the remaining shares allow
the minority shareholder to exert a decisive influence.
2. The Purview Left to Articles 85
and 86 of the EEC Treaty
A merger or an acquisition of control over each other is not the only way for
undertakings to cooperate. Other ways and means of such cooperation are manifold. These alternative ways and means, however, may violate articles 85 and
86 of the EEC Treaty; therefore, all undertakings, when cooperating with each
other, have to observe a two-pronged standard of Community antitrust law. Not
only must undertakings observe Regulation 4064/89, but also articles 85 and 86
of the EEC Treaty. Articles 85 and 86 represent primary Community law and take
precedence over Regulation 4064, which is mere secondary Community law.
Article 22 of Regulation 4064/89 tries to avoid any collision between the
Regulation and articles 85 and 86 by providing in paragraph 1 that "[t]his
Regulation alone shall apply to concentrations as defined in Article 3" and by
WINTER 1991
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decreeing, in paragraph 2, that "Regulations No. 17,38 (EEC) No. 1017/68, 39
(EEC) No. 4056/8640 and (EEC) No. 3975/8741 shall not apply" to such concentrations.
3. The Position of Joint Ventures
The position of joint ventures under the Regulation was a highly debated
theme. In practice, joint ventures come in many varieties.42 Some may be
viewed as concentrations within the meaning of Regulation 4064/89 and therefore fall under its purview. Others may be qualified as mere instruments of
cooperation wholly out of the reach of the Regulation, but eventually affected by
articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. In paragraph 23 of its preamble, the
Regulation states that it is appropriate to define the concept of concentration in
such a manner as to cover only operations bringing about a lasting change in the
structure of the undertakings concerned; that it is therefore necessary to exclude,
from the scope of this Regulation, those operations that have as their object or
effect the coordination of the competitive behavior of undertakings that remain
independent, since such operations fall under the appropriate provisions of the
regulations implementing articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty; and that it is
appropriate, therefore, to make this distinction specifically in the case of the
creation of a joint venture.
To implement this objective, article 3, paragraph 2 provides that the creation
of a joint venture, which has as its object or effect only the coordination of the
competitive behavior of undertakings that remain independent, shall not constitute a concentration within the meaning of the Regulation. However, the creation
of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, which does not give rise to a coordination of the competitive behavior of the parties amongst themselves or between them and the joint
venture, shall constitute such a concentration.
D.

THE APPRAISAL OF CONCENTRATIONS

Pursuant to article 2, paragraph 1 of Regulation 4064/89, all concentrations
within the scope of the Regulation will be appraised with a view to establishing
whether or not they are "compatible with the common market." When rendering
those decisions, the Commission shall take into account:
(a) the need to preserve and develop effective competition within the common market in view of, among other things, the structure of the markets

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

5 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 13) 204 (1962).
11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 175) 1 (1968).
29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 378) 4 (1986).
30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 1 (1987).
See Niemeyer, Die Europaische Fusionskontrollverordnung (Sonderveroffentlichung zum
RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT) 17 (1991).
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concerned and the actual or potential competition from undertakings
located either within or without the Community;
(b) the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic
and financial power, the opportunities available to suppliers and users,
their access to supplies or markets, any legal or other barriers to entry,
supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the development of
technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition. 4 3
All the above criteria illustrate a competition-oriented merger control policy
except the last one, which allows industrial policy considerations to be taken into
account. In the last criterion, an anticompetitive effect is tolerated as far as it
serves the development of technical and economic progress in the Community.
Through the last criterion, the Commission is able to use the Regulation as a
means to strengthen the competitiveness of European companies in relation to
their non-EEC competitors such as Japanese and U.S. multinationals. 44
Thus, the criteria to determine whether a concentration is compatible with the
common market are still a mix of competitive and industrial policy goals. 45
Although heavily criticized by Germany and Great Britain, 46 both states accepted
this mix in order to achieve Community solidarity. Whether the new merger
control policy is more industrial-policy-oriented or competition-oriented will
depend on the Commission's enforcement strategies. 47
According to article 2, paragraph 3, a concentration shall be declared incompatible with the Common Market, if it "creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded
in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it." This test goes beyond the
scope of article 86 of the EEC Treaty in requiring a determination of whether a
dominant position is "created or strengthened" as a result of the planned merger.
The creation and the reinforcement of a dominant market position already suffices to trigger the application of the Regulation whereas such existence or
strengthening would not be sufficient under article 86. Moreover, article 86
requires an "abuse" of such a dominant position. Article 2 of the Regulation
therefore fills one of the main gaps in EEC merger policy. In addition, by
excluding a wide range of exemptions based on noneconomic criteria like those
in article 85, paragraph 3 of the EEC Treaty, the Regulation provides a more
predictable basis both for the undertakings concerned and for Member States.
43. Regulation 4064/89, art. 2, para. l(a) & (b), 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 395) 1, 3 (1989).
44. See Schwartz, New EEC Regulation on Mergers, Partial Mergers and Joint Ventures,
European/American Antitrust and Trade Law, FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. ch. 21 (1988); Elland, supra
note 28, at 116.
45. See Schmidt, Die Europaische Fusionskontroll-Verordnung, WIRTSCHAFrSDIENST 90, 93 (1990).
46. See supra section II.A. Historical Background.
47. See Commission Press Release IP (90) 751 (Sept. 24, 1980) (statements of Sir Leon Brittan).
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The Regulation does not contain an express definition of market dominance.
According to paragraph 15 of the preamble, a concentration is not considered
likely to impede competition if the market share of the undertakings concerned
is less than 25 percent of the relevant market. An undertaking possessing a
market share of less than 25 percent could hardly be regarded as dominating a
to have a dominant position
market. The Commission regards an undertaking
48
when its market share exceeds 45 percent.
E.

PROCEDURE

Regulation 4064/89 establishes numerous procedural rules. They are necessary principally because article 22, paragraph 2 provides that other Community
competition enforcement procedures are not applicable to concentrations defined
in article 3. Enforcement procedures specifically excluded include Regulation
No. 17, which is the main regulation concerning EEC antitrust procedure, as
well as Regulations 1017/68,50 4056/86,51 and 3975/87.52
1. PriorNotification and Suspension
Pursuant to article 4, paragraph 1 of Regulation 4064/89, concentrations of a
Community dimension as defined above have to be notified to the Commission
not later than one week after the conclusion of the agreement, or after the
announcement of a public bid, or after the acquisition of a controlling interest,
whichever is earliest. When the merger is consensual or is carried through by a
joint acquisition, all the parties together must make the notification. In other
cases, such as contested mergers, only the acquisitor has to notify. Pursuant to
article 14, paragraph 1, if an undertaking intentionally or negligently fails to
fulfill its obligation under article 4 by omitting any notification or supplying
incorrect or misleading information, the undertaking will be liable for fines
between 1,000 and 50,000 ECU.
The requirement of notification is linked to the principle of suspension. By
article 7 the notified concentration may not be put into effect either before its
notification or within the first three weeks following the notification. The Commission may decide on its own initiative to continue the suspension when this is
necessary in order to review the notified concentration. Any transaction carried
out in contravention of the suspension can be voided retroactively depending on
the final decision of the Commission, and again, pursuant to article 14, para-

48. See Ehlermann, Die Europczische Fusionskontrolle lauft glatter als gedacht, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, Jan. 14, 1981, at 13 (Director General of Directorate IV, which administers
competition matters).
49. 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 13) 204 (1962).
50. 11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 175) 1 (1968).
51. 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 378) 4 (1986).
52. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 1 (1987).
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graph 2, a failure to observe this rule exposes the undertakings concerned to fines
of up to 10 percent of their aggregate worldwide turnover.
By means of articles 4 and 7, for the first time, a policy of mandatory notification and suspension has been put into effect in the Community with respect
to large-scale mergers. These provisions mark a significant change in European
merger control in comparison to Irticles
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty,53 which
54
facto.
post
ex
applied
be
could only
2. Examination of the Notification
After having received the complete notification, the Commission must examine the facts promptly and pursuant to article 6, paragraph 1:
(a) Where it concludes that the concentration notified does not fall within the scope of
the Regulation, it shall record that finding by means of a decision.
(b) Where it finds that the concentration notified, although falling within the scope of
this Regulation, does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common
market, it shall decide not to oppose it and shall declare that it is compatible with the
common market.
(c) If, on the other hand, it finds that the concentration notified falls within the scope
of this Regulation and raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common
market, it shall decide to initiate proceedings.
In each of these cases the Commission must make the decision, according to
article 10, paragraph 1, within one month after receipt of a complete notification.
This period may be increased to six weeks, however, when the Commission
receives a request from a Member State in accordance with article 9, paragraph
2, which leaves certain competences with the national authorities insofar as the
merger particularly affects their domestic markets. 55 If no decision has been
taken within these deadlines, the notified concentration is deemed to be compatible with the common market.
The preliminary examination procedure gives immediate clarification to the
undertakings concerned whether the notified concentration is likely to conform
with Regulation 4064/89. Where the concentration does not fall within the scope
of the Regulation or where it does not present any serious problem, the Commission will so notify the undertakings. Otherwise, if the Commission, after its
first examination, decides the notified concentration may not be compatible with
the common market, the Commission will initiate proceedings under article 6,
paragraph 1(c) to gather additional information about the concentration.
3. Initiation of Proceedings
If the Commission has initiated investigative proceedings according to article 6,
paragraph 1(c), it has to make a final decision on the compatibility of the concen53. See Fine, EC Merger Control: An Analysis of the New Regulation, 1990 EUR. COMPET. L.
REV. 47.
54. See Elland, supra note 28, at 112.
55. See infra section II.F. Remaining Competences for National Authorities.
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tration as soon as all doubts on the validity of the concentration have disappeared.
This is particularly the case where doubts can be removed following modifications
by the parties as provided in article 8, paragraph 2. In any event, according to article
10, paragraph 3, the Commission must render its final decision within four months
of the date on which the proceedings were initiated. Under article 10, paragraph 4,
this period can be further extended for two reasons: when one of the parties has not
made a complete notification, and the Commission has to request information pursuant to article 11; or, if the Commission has to order an investigation pursuant to
article 13, when one of the undertakings concerned is uncooperative and further
examination is needed. After expiration of the four-month time limit, the transaction
is deemed compatible with the common market by virtue of article 10, paragraph 6.
The Commission estimates that it will normally take the maximum period of five
months to rule on the compatibility of a merger when a full investigation is required. 56
4. Remedies
According to article 21, paragraph 1, the European Court of Justice has the power
to review the decisions taken under Regulation 4064/89. The undertakings involved
57
may challenge a Commission's decision that the concentration is incompatible
with the common market. They may bring an action before the European Court of
Justice by virtue of article 173, paragraph 2 of the EEC Treaty.
If the Commission has found in favor of the undertakings concerned, the
Member States may also challenge the decision under article 173, paragraph 1 of
the EEC Treaty. Any other natural or legal person, however, who is not the
addressee of the Commission's decision normally does not have locus standi
under article 173, paragraph 2. Only exceptionally, when a complaint of a
competitor leads to an investigation and, for example, to the exoneration of the
defendants, is the complainant regarded as individually concerned by the final
decision and therefore allowed to institute proceedings under the aforementioned
article. 58 Furthermore, under article 16, the Court of Justice has unlimited
jurisdiction under article 172 of the EEC Treaty to review decisions in which the
Commission has assessed a fine or periodic penalty payments.
F.

REMAINING COMPETENCES FOR NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

In 1969 the European Court of Justice held in Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt59 that Community and national competition laws operate in separate but
parallel spheres. This concept of parallelism, however, has recently been criticized. In view of the establishment of the internal market by the end of 1992,
Community law has increased in importance. Many believe giving precedence to
Community law over the laws of the Member States is more suitable.
56. See Elland, supra note 28, at 114.
57. Decisions regarding compatibility are pursuant to art. 8, para. 2 & 3.
58. Case 75/84 Metro v. Com'n, [1986] E.C.R. 3021; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,326.
59. Case 14/68 Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, [1969] E.C.R. 1; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8056.
VOL. 25, NO. 4

EEC MERGER CONTROL RULES

873

Regulation 4064/89 has paved new ways regarding the priority of Community
law over national laws. Pursuant to article 21, paragraph 2, national competition
legislation is no longer applicable to any concentration having Community dimension. 60 Nevertheless, this so-called "one-stop shopping," especially favored
by the United Kingdom, is not without exemptions. Three of these exemptions
deserve special attention.
The first results from article 21, paragraph 2 of the Regulation. Since that
article only applies to concentrations within the scope of the Regulation, the
concept of parallelism still covers concentrations not having Community dimension. To such concentrations the national competition regulations continue to
apply and articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty also remain applicable.
A second exemption to the one-stop-shopping rule is found in article 9 (the
German clause). Upon request, the Commission may refer a notified concentration covered by the Regulation to the competent national authorities, which will
then apply their own national competition laws to the concentration. This clause
is limited to concentrations that may threaten to create or strengthen a dominant
position in a market within that Member State. The market must have all the
characteristics of a distinct market, regardless of whether tle market is a substantial part of the common market.
Pursuant to paragraph 7 of article 9, a "distinct" market is an area in which the
competitive conditions are homogeneous and which exhibits appreciably different
conditions in comparison to neighboring areas. The assessment shall take into account the nature and characteristics of the goods or services concerned, the existence
of entry barriers, consumer preferences, and substantial price differences. If the
Commission concludes that a distinct market does not exist or the concentration does
not seem to threaten competition within a distinct market, then the Commission will
not refer the case to the national authorities. Even if the Commission regards the
requirements of article 9, paragraph 2 as satisfied, it nevertheless may itself deal
with the case, pursuant to article 9, paragraph 3.
The German clause must be 'regarded as a compromise between the position of
the Commission trying to obtain sole jurisdiction on concentrations having Community dimension and the position of countries wishing to retain their own
competence to challenge concentrations which may affect their own national
economies. Germany in particular tried to defend its own competition-oriented
concept of merger control against imposition of a system that seemed to be
unduly influenced by industrial policy considerations. 61 The referral procedure
under article 9, however, is only expected to be applied in exceptional cases. 62
This referral provision is also subject to review before the end of December
1993, along with other provisions of the Regulation.

60. See Hornsby, National and Community Control of Concentrationsin a Single Market: Should
Member States Be Allowed to Impose Stricter Standards?, 1988 EuR. L. REV. 195.
61. See Soames, supra note 26, at 222.
62. See Elland, supra note 28, at 116.
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A third exemption to the exclusive application of Regulation 4064/89 to concentrations of Community dimension is contained in article 21, paragraph 3. This
provision allows Member States, where the Commission has found a notified concentration to be compatible with the common market, to take appropriate measures
for the protection of their own legitimate interests-interests other than those taken
into consideration by the Regulation. Public security, plurality of the media, and
prudential rules are specified as legitimate interests. This enumeration, however, is
not exhaustive. Any other interests regarded by a Member State as legitimate in the
meaning of article 21, paragraph 3 may be notified to the Commission. The Commission will then decide whether this interest is compatible with the general principles of the Treaty, such as the principles of proportionality and legitimate expectation.63 Article 21, paragraph 3, however, does not create any new rights for the
Member States. 64 This provision only clarifies that the enforcement of national
interests other than merger control objectives may as a practical matter contravene a
decision taken by the Commission under Regulation 4064/89.
III. Conclusion: The First Hundred
Days of Regulation 4064/89
The adoption of Council Regulation on 4064/89 on September 21, 1990,
constituted a fundamental change in European merger control policy. From its
theoretical beginnings, the new Regulation, by providing a system of mandatory
prior notification, has reduced many uncertainties for the undertakings involved,
uncertainties that had existed since the Continental Can judgment. Furthermore,
the Regulation is a promising attempt to bring consistency into the European
merger control policies hitherto subject to widely divergent national antitrust
laws and enforcement by Member States.
During the first three months, the Commission dealt with fifteen concentrations
that came within the scope of the new Regulation. So far, the Commission has
rendered nine decisions. The Commission found all nine concentrations compatible
with the common market. The Chairman of General Directorate IV, in charge of
competition matters, considers the new EC Regulation to have fulfilled the requirement of practicability.65 Fewer deficiencies came to light than critics had predicted. 6 6
In summary, the adoption of Regulation 4064/89 is an important step toward
a more uniform merger policy in Europe. The Regulation provides the Community
with an instrument that seems to be appropriate to meet the challenge of the future
internal market. The new EEC Regulation on merger control has stood its first test.
63. Id.at 117.

64. See Soames, supra note 26, at 222.
65. See Ehlermann, supra note 48.
66. See Practitionersare Criticalof EC Merger ControlRegulation, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 719 (May 10, 1980); Pathak, EEC ConcentrationControl: The ForeseeableUncertainties, 1990 EUR. COMPET. L. REV. 119; Ridyard, An Economic Perspective on the EC Merger Regulation, 1990 EuR. COMPET. L. REV. 247.
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